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Abstract
We propose a novel framework for the differentially private ERM, input perturba-
tion. Existing differentially private ERM implicitly assumed that the data contributors
submit their private data to a database expecting that the database invokes a differen-
tially private mechanism for publication of the learned model. In input perturbation,
each data contributor independently randomizes her/his data by itself and submits
the perturbed data to the database. We show that the input perturbation framework
theoretically guarantees that the model learned with the randomized data eventually
satisfies differential privacy with the prescribed privacy parameters. At the same time,
input perturbation guarantees that local differential privacy is guaranteed to the server.
We also show that the excess risk bound of the model learned with input perturbation
is O(1/n) under a certain condition, where n is the sample size. This is the same as
the excess risk bound of the state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
In recent years, differential privacy has become widely recognized as a theoretical defini-
tion for output privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b). Let us suppose a database collects private
information from data contributors. Analysts can submit queries to learn knowledge from
the database. Query-answering algorithms that satisfy differential privacy return responses
such that the distribution of outputs does not change significantly and is independent of
whether the database contains particular private information submitted by any single data
contributor. Based on this idea, a great deal of effort has been devoted to guaranteeing
differential privacy for various problems. For example, there are algorithms for privacy-
preserving classification (Jain and Thakurta, 2014), regression (Lei, 2011), etc.
Differentially private empirical risk minimization (ERM), or more generally, differentially
private convex optimization, has attracted a great deal of research interest in machine
learning, for example, (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Jain and Thakurta, 2014;
Bassily et al., 2014). These works basically follow the standard setting of differentially
private mechanisms; the database collects examples and builds a model with the collected
examples so that the released model satisfies differential privacy.
∗This work was done when he was a master’s student in the Dept. of Computer Science, Graduated
School of SIE, University of Tsukuba
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Table 1: Comparison of differentially private ERM. All methods assume that `2 norm of the
parameters is bounded by η, the loss function is ζ-Lipschitz continuous. n and d denote the
number of examples and the dimension of the parameter, respectively.
Method Pertur-
bation
Privacy Utility Additional
requirements
Objective (Chaudhuri
et al., 2011; Kifer et al.,
2012)
obj.
func.
(, δ)-DP for model O
(
ηζ
√
d log(1/δ)
n
)
λ-smooth
Gradient De-
scent (Bassily et al.,
2014)
grad. (, δ)-DP for model O
(
ηζ
√
d log2(n/δ)
n
)
Input (proposal) example
(α,δ)-DP for model
(β
√
,δ)-DLP for data
s.t. O(
√
αn) = β
O
(
ηζ
√
d log(1/δ)
αn
)
λ-smooth
quadratic loss
Recently, the data collection process is also recognized as an important step in privacy
preservation. With this motivation, a local privacy was introduced as a privacy notion in
the data collection process (Wainwright et al., 2012; Duchi et al., 2013; Kairouz et al.,
2014). However, the existing methods of differentially private ERM are specifically derived
for satisfying differential privacy of the released model, and thus there is no guarantee for
the local privacy.
In this work, we aim to preserve the local privacy of the data and the differential privacy
of the released model simultaneously in the setting of releasing the model constructed by
ERM. The goal of this paper is to derive a differentially private mechanism with an utility
guarantee, at the same time, the mechanism satisfies the local privacy in the data collection
process.
Related Work. Chaudhuri et al. Chaudhuri et al. (2011) formulated the problem of differ-
entially private empirical risk minimization (ERM) and presented two different approaches:
output perturbation and objective perturbation. Kifer et al. Kifer et al. (2012) improved the
utility of objective perturbation by adding an extra `2 regularizer into the objective func-
tion. Moreover, they introduced a variant of objective perturbation that employs Gaussian
distribution for the random linear term, which improves dimensional dependency from O(d)
to O(
√
d) whereas the satisfying privacy is relaxed from (, 0)-differential privacy to (, δ)-
differential privacy (Table 1, line 1). Objective perturbation is work well for smooth losses,
whereas Bassily et al. Bassily et al. (2014) proved that it is suboptimal for non-smooth
losses. They developed the optimal algorithm of (, δ)-differentially private ERM, named
differentially private gradient descent. It conducts the stochastic gradient decent where the
gradient is perturbed by adding a Gaussian noise. They showed that the expected empirical
excess risk of the differentially private gradient descent is optimal up to multiplicative factor
of log n and log(1/δ) even for non-smooth losses (Table 1, line 2). They also provides the
optimal mechanisms that satisfy (, 0)-differential privacy for strong and non-strong convex
losses. Jain et al. Jain and Thakurta (2014) showed that for the specific applications, the
dimensional dependency of the excess risk can be improved from polynomic to constant
or logarithmic. These studies assume that the database collects raw data from the data
contributors, and so no attention has been paid to the data collection phase.
Recently, a new privacy notion referred to as local privacy (Wainwright et al., 2012; Duchi
et al., 2013; Kairouz et al., 2014) has been presented. In these studies, data are drawn from
a distribution by each contributor independently and communicated to the data collector
via a noisy channel; local privacy is a privacy notion that ensures that data cannot be
accurately estimated from individual privatized data. Duchi et al. (2013) has introduced
a private convex optimization mechanism that satisfies the local privacy. Their method
has guarantee of differential privacy for the model, whereas its privacy level is same as the
differential local privacy.
2
Our Contribution. In this study, we propose a novel framework for the differentially
private ERM, input perturbation (Table 1, line 3). In contrast to the existing methods, input
perturbation allows data contributors to take part in the process of privacy preservation of
model learning. The mechanism of input perturbation is quite simple: each data contributor
independently randomizes her/his data with a Gaussian distribution, in which the noise
variance is determined by a function of privacy parameters (, δ), sample size n, and some
constants related to the loss function.
In this paper, we prove that models learned with randomized examples following our in-
put perturbation scheme are guaranteed to satisfy (α, δ)-differential privacy under some
conditions, especially, (, δ)-differential privacy if α = 1 (Table 1, line 3, column 3). The
guarantee of differential privacy is proved using the fact that the difference between the
objective function of input perturbation and that of objective perturbation is probabilis-
tically bounded. To achieve this approximation with randomization by independent data
contributors, input perturbation requires that the loss function be quadratic with respect
to the model parameter, w (Table 1, line 3, column 5).
From the perspective of data contributors, data collection with input perturbation satisfies
the local privacy with the privacy parameter (β
√
, δ) where β = O(
√
αn) (Table 1, line 3,
column 3). In the input perturbation framework, not only differential privacy of the learned
models, but also privacy protection of data against the database is attained. From this
perspective, we theoretically and empirically investigate the influence of input perturbation
on the excess risk.
We compared the utility analysis of input perturbation with those of the output and objec-
tive perturbation methods in terms of the expectation of the excess empirical risk. We show
that the excess risk of the model learned with input perturbation is O(1/αn) (Table 1, line
3, column 4). If α = 1, the utility and the privacy guarantee of the model are equivalent to
that of objective perturbation.
All proofs defer to the full version of this paper due to space limitation.
2 Problem Definition and Preliminary
Let Z = X × Y be the domain of examples. The objective of supervised prediction is
to learn a parameter w on a closed convex domain W ⊆ Rd from a collection of given
examples D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where w parametrizes a predictor that outputs y ∈ Y from
x ∈ X . Let ` :W ×Z → R be a loss function. Learning algorithms following the empirical
risk minimization principle choose the model that minimizes the empirical risk:
J(w;D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(w, (xi, yi)) +
1
n
Ω(w), (1)
where Ω(w) is a convex regularizer. We suppose that the following assumptions hold
throughout this paper: 1) W is bounded, i.e., there is η s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ η for all w ∈ W, 2) `
is doubly continuously differentiable w.r.t. w, 3) ` is ζ-Lipschitz, i.e., ‖∇`(w, (x, y))‖2 ≤ ζ
for any w ∈ W and (x, y) ∈ Z, and 4) ` is λ-smooth, i.e., ‖∇2`(w, (x, y))‖2 ≤ λ for any
w ∈ W and (x, y) ∈ Z where ‖ · ‖ is the `2 matrix norm.
Three stakeholders appear in the problem we consider: data contributors, database, and
model user. Each data contributor owns a single example (xi, yi). The goal is that the model
user obtains the modelw learned by ERM, at the same time, privacy of the data contributors
is ensured against the database and the model user. Let us consider the following process
of data collection and model learning.
3
1. All the stakeholders reach an agreement on the privacy parameters (, δ) before data
collection
2. Each data contributor independently perturbs its own example and sends it to the
database
3. The database conducts model learning at the request of the model user with the collected
perturbed examples and publishes the model
Note that once a data contributor sends her perturbed example to the database, she can
no longer interact with the database. This setting is suitable for real use, for example,
if the data contributors sends their own data to the database via their smartphones, the
database is difficult to always interact with the data contributors due to instability of internet
connection. In this process, the privacy concerns arise at two occasions; when the data
contributors release their own data to the database (data privacy), and when the database
publishes the learned model to the model user (model privacy).
Model privacy. The model privacy is preserved by guaranteeing the (, δ)-differential
privacy. It is a privacy definition of a randomization mechanism M which is a stochastic
mapping from a set of examples D to an output on an arbitrary domain O. Given two
databases D and D′, we say D and D′ are neighbor databases, or D ∼ D′, if two databases
differ in at most one element. Then, differential privacy is defined as follows:
Definition 1 ((, δ)-differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006a)). A randomization mechanism
M is (, δ)-differential privacy, if, for all pairs (D,D′) s.t. D ∼ D′ and for any subset of
ranges S ⊆ O,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp()Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ. (2)
Data privacy. For the definition of the data privacy, we introduce the differential local
privacy (Wainwright et al., 2012; Duchi et al., 2013; Kairouz et al., 2014). Because of the
data collection and model learning process, the non-interactive case of the local privacy
should be considered, where in this case, individuals release his/her private data without
seeing the other individuals’ private data. Under the non-interactive setting, the differential
local privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-differential local privacy (Wainwright et al., 2012; Evfimievski et al.,
2003; Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011)). A randomization mechanismM is (, δ)-differentially
locally private, if, for all pairs (z, z′) s.t. z 6= z′ and for any subset of ranges S ⊆ O,
Pr[M(z) ∈ S] ≤ exp()Pr[M(z′) ∈ S] + δ. (3)
Utility. To assess utility, we use the empirical excess risk. Let wˆ = arg minw∈W J(w;D).
Given a randomization mechanism M that (randomly) outputs w over W, the empirical
excess risk of M is defined as J(M(D);D)− J(wˆ;D).
3 Input Perturbation
In this section, we introduce a novel framework for differentially private ERM. The objective
of the input perturbation framework is three-fold:
• (data privacy) The released data from the data contributors to the database satisfies
(O(
√
n), δ)-differentially locally private,
• (model privacy) The model resulted from the process eventually meets (, δ)-differentially
private,
• (utility) The expectation of the excess empirical risk of the resulting models is O(1/n),
which is equivalent to that obtained with non-privacy-preserving model learning.
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Algorithm 1 Input Perturbation
Public Input: , δ, d, n, η, ζ and λ
Input of data contributor i: xi, yi
Output of data contributor i: q˜i, p˜i
1: γ, δ′ ← δ2 , a =
√
log(2/γ)
n , σ
2
b ← ζ
2(8 log 2/δ′+4)
2 , σ
2
u >
(√
2daλ+
√
2da2λ2+ 2λ (1−2a)
(1−2a)
)2
2: Sampling of noise vectors: ri ∼ N (0, σ
2
b
n I), ui ∼ N (0, σ
2
u
n I)
3: q˜i ← qi + ui, p˜i ← pi − ri where qi = q(xi, yi) and pi = p(xi, yi)
4: Submission: Send q˜i, p˜i to the database
Furthermore, we show that by adjusting the noise variance that the input perturbation
injects, the input perturbation satisfies (α, δ)-differential privacy and (β, δ)-differential
local privacy with the O(1/αn) excess empirical risk where β = O(
√
αn).
3.1 Loss Function for Input Perturbation
The strategy of input perturbation is to minimize a function that is close to the objective
function of the objective perturbation method. The requirements on the loss and objec-
tive function thus basically follow the objective perturbation method with the Gaussian
noise (Kifer et al., 2012). Input perturbation allows any (possibly non-differential) convex
regularizer as supported by objective perturbation. However, for simplicity, we consider the
non-regularized case where Ω(w) = 0.
In addition to the requirements from the objective perturbation, input perturbation requires
a restriction; the loss function is quadratic in w. Let q(xi, yi) and p(xi, yi) be d dimensional
vectors and s(xi, yi) be a scalar. Then, our quadratic loss function has a form:
`(w, (x, y)) =
1
2
wTq(x, y)q(x, y)Tw − p(x, y)Tw + s(x, y).
3.2 Input Perturbation Method
In this subsection, we introduce the input perturbation method. Algorithm 1 describes
the detail of input perturbation; Algorithm 2 describes model learning with examples ran-
domized with input perturbation. In Algorithm 1, each data contributor transforms owing
example (xi, yi) into (qi,pi), where qi = q(xi, yi),pi = p(xi, yi). Then, she adds pertur-
bation to (qi,pi) in Step 3. We denote the example after perturbation by (q˜i, p˜i), which is
submitted to the database independently by each data contributors.
In Algorithm 2, the database collects the perturbed examples D˜ = {q˜i, p˜i}ni=1 from the n
data contributors. Then, the database learns a model with these randomized examples by
minimizing
J in(w; D˜) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
wT q˜iq˜
T
i w − p˜Ti w + si
)
+
∆in
2n
‖w‖22. (4)
In the following subsections, we show the privacy guarantee of the input perturbation in
the sense of the differential local privacy and the differential privacy. The utility analysis of
models obtained following the input perturbation framework is also shown.
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Algorithm 2 Model Learning on Input Perturbation
Require: , δ, d, n, η, ζ and λ
1: All stakeholders agree with (, δ) and share parameters d, n, η, ζ and λ.
2: The database collects (q˜i, p˜i) from the data contributors with Algorithm 1.
3: The database learns win = arg minw∈W J
in(w; D˜) with ∆in = ∆− 2λ .
4: Return win.
3.3 Privacy of Input Perturbation
In this subsection, we analyze the privacy of the input perturbation in the sense of the data
privacy and the model privacy.
Data privacy of input perturbation. In Algorithm 1, each data contributor of the input
perturbation adds a Gaussian noise into the released data. Adding a Gaussian noise into
the released data satisfies (, δ)-differential local privacy as well as the Gaussian mecha-
nism (Dwork et al., 2014). As a result, we get the following corollary that shows the level
of the differential local privacy of Algorithm 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose that q and p in Algorithm 1 are in the bounded domain with the size
parameter B. Then, Algorithm 1 satisfies (2c
√
n(λ/σu+ζ/σb), 2δ)-differential local privacy,
where c >
√
2 ln(1.25/δ).
Since we have λ/σu + ζ/σb → (
√
λ
2 +
√

8 log(2/δ′)+4 )
√
 as n → ∞, Algorithm 1 is
(O(
√
n), δ)-differentially locally private.
Model privacy of input perturbation. The following theorem states the guarantee of
differential privacy of models that the database learns from examples randomized by the
input perturbation scheme.
Theorem 1. Let D˜ be examples perturbed by Algorithm 1 with privacy parameters  and δ.
Then, if ∆ > 2λ and γ =
δ
2 , the output of Algorithm 2 satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
The main idea of the proof is that the objective function of the input perturbation scheme
holds the same linear perturbation term as that of objective perturbation. The objective
function of input perturbation in Eq. 4 is rearranged as:
J in(w; D˜) =
∑
i
`(w, (xi, yi)) + b
Tw +
∆0 + ∆− 2λ
2n
wTw. (5)
where ∆02nw
Tw = 12nw
T (UTU + UTQ + QTU)w and U = [u1, · · · ,un]T . The deriva-
tion can be found in the proof of Theorem 1. In the linear term, b forms a random
vector generated from N (0, ζ2(8 log(2/δ′)+4)2 I), which is exactly the same as the random
linear regularization term introduced in the objective perturbation method. By noting that
limn→∞UTU = 2λ I and limn→∞U
TQ = limn→∞QTU = O, the objective function of
input perturbation is equivalent to that of objective perturbation with an infinitely large
number of samples.
For guarantee of differential privacy with a finite number of samples n, we use the following
probabilistic bound of ∆0.
Lemma 1. Let U = [u1, · · · ,un]T , where ui ∼ N (0, σ
2
u
n Id). Let ∆0w
Tw = wT (UTU +
UTQ+QTU)w. Then, for any γ > 0, with probability at least 1− γ, we get the following
bound:
κ(n, γ) ≤ ∆0 ≤ κ(n, γ),
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where
κ(n, γ) =σ2u
(
1 + 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
+ 2
log(4/γ)
n
)
+ 2
√
2dλσu
√
log(2/γ)
n
κ(n, γ) =σ2u
(
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
− 2
√
2dσuλ
√
log(2/γ)
n
.
The proof can be found in Lemma 1. This bound shows how ∆0 generated with n samples
is distant from σ2u. Setting σ
2
u as in Algorithm 1, we can get ∆0 ≥ 2λ w.p. 1 − γ. Thus,
the output of input perturbation guarantees (, δ)-differential privacy w.p. 1−γ. The proof
of Theorem 1 is obtained by incorporating the probabilistic bound on ∆0 into the privacy
proof of (Kifer et al., 2012).
3.4 Utility Analysis
The following theorem shows the excess empirical error bound of the model learned by input
perturbation:
Lemma 2. Let win be the output of Algorithm 2. If ∆ > 2λ and examples are randomized
by Algorithm 1, w.p. at least 1− γ − β the bound of the excess empirical risk is
J(win;D)− J(wˆ;D) ≤
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4) log
1
β
n2∆
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22
+
σ2u
√
log 4γ + σ
2
u
log 4γ√
n
+ σuλ
√
2d log 2γ
n
√
n
‖wˆ‖22
In the right side of the bound, the first two terms of O(1/n) are the same as the excess
empirical risk of objective perturbation (Kifer et al., 2012). The third term of O(1/n) and
the last term of O(1/n3/2) are introduced by input perturbation. The same holds with
expectation of the excess risk, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let win be the output of Algorithm 2. If ∆ > 2λ , n ≥ 16 log 8δ ,
and examples are randomized by Algorithm 1, expectation of the excess empirical risk
E
[
J(win;D)− J(wˆ;D)] = O( ζ‖wˆ‖2√d log(1/δ)n ) by setting ∆ = Θ(√ζ2d log(1/δ)‖wˆ‖2
)
and
σu as the lowest value specified in Algorithm 1.
3.5 Balancing Local Privacy and Utility
The privacy parameters of the differential local privacy that satisfy the input perturba-
tion are (O(
√
n), δ). Unfortunately, the privacy level of the input perturbation becomes
weaker as the sample size n increases. However, the input perturbation can satisfy stronger
differential local privacy by adjusting . If the data contributors require stronger local pri-
vacy, we set  ← α for small α ∈ (0, 1), which enables the input perturbation to satisfy
(O(
√
αn), δ)-differential local privacy. Such setting of  results in a higher privacy guarantee
of the published model as (α, δ)-differentially private, and a lower utility as O(1/αn).
4 Experiments
In this section, we examine the performance of input perturbation by experimentation. As
predicted by Theorem 2, under the same privacy guarantee and the optimal setting of σ2u in
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input perturbation, the expectation of the excess empirical risk of the models learned with
the input perturbation and the objective perturbation is the same as O(
ζ‖wˆ‖2
√
d log(1/δ)
n ).
We experimentally evaluate the difference between the input perturbation and the objective
perturbation with real datasets while changing the size of training data and privacy pa-
rameters. We compared the performance of the input perturbation method (Input) against
two methods, namely, output perturbation with Laplace mechanism (Output), (Chaudhuri
et al., 2011), and objective perturbation with the Gaussian mechanism (Obj-Gauss) (Kifer
et al., 2012). We evaluated all approaches to learn the linear regression model and the logis-
tic regression model. For the performance measure, the root mean squared error (RMSE)
was used for the linear regression model and the prediction accuracy was used for the logistic
regression model. For regularization parameter tuning, with each method we found the best
parameter for the largest size of training dataset, then used it for other sizes of the training
dataset.
In each experiment, we randomly divided the examples into a training dataset and a test
dataset with the ratio 4 : 1; we trained the model with the training dataset and evaluated
the performance measure with the test dataset. The average results over 100 trials were
reported. We used IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimizer to optimize the objective function.
4.1 Dataset and Preprocessing
We used a dataset from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: (IPMS) (Minnesota, 2014),
which contains 3, 833, 838 census records collected in the US for year 2000 after removing
unknown values and missing values. We performed an experiment with n, the size of the
training dataset, by each 4 times from 27(= 128) to 221(= 2, 097, 152). We set privacy
parameters  = {0.1, 1.0}, δ = 0.01.
The IPMS dataset originally contained 13 features. The binary status Marital status was
transformed into two attributes: Is Single and Is Married. Hence, 14 attributes were em-
ployed. For linear regression model learning, Annual Income, a continuous feature, was
used as the prediction target. For logistic regression model learning, we converted Annual
Income into a binary attribute and used it as the label, in which values higher than a pre-
defined threshold were mapped to 1, and 0 otherwise. In both kinds of model learning, the
remaining attributes were used for the features. As preprocessing, we scaled the feature
values so that the norm of each feature vector was at most 1; annual income used as the
prediction target was scaled so that the norm was at most 1 before transformation to the
binary label.
4.2 Results
Figure 1 (a) and (b) show the experimental results of differentially private linear regression
model learning. In Figure 1, the horizontal axis shows the logarithmic scale of the example
size n, and the vertical axis shows the average RMSE of the comparative methods. As
predicted by the theorem, the results show that the average RMSE of input perturbation
approaches the RMSE of non-privacy linear regression as n increases. Therefore, when the
number of instances is very large, the performance of input perturbation is almost the same
as that of non-privacy, as confirmed by Theorem 2.
Input perturbation is an approximation of objective perturbation with the Gaussian mech-
anism. So, at the limit of n, the behavior of input perturbation is equivalent to that of
objective perturbation with the Gaussian mechanism. This can be confirmed from the re-
sults, too. Even with small n, we can see that the RMSEs of Input and Obj-Gauss are still
8
(a)  = 0.1 (b)  = 1.0
Figure 1: RMSEs of differentially private linear regression. The results were averaged over
100 trials while changing the example size n. We compared input perturbation (Input),
output perturbation with Laplace mechanism (Output), and objective perturbation with
Gaussian mechanism (Obj-Gauss), and non-private linear regression as the baseline (NP).
(a)  = 0.1 (b)  = 1.0
Figure 2: Accuracy of differentially private logistic regression. The results were averaged
over 100 trials while changing the example size n. We compared input perturbation (Input),
output perturbation with Laplace mechanism (Output), and objective perturbation with
Gaussian mechanism (Obj-Gauss), and non-private linear regression as the baseline (NP).
quite close in both figures. This is because the difference of the excess risk of objective and
input perturbation is in O(1/n3/2).
4.3 Differentially Private Logistic Regression Model Learning
Figure 2 shows the experimental results of differentially private logistic regression model
learning. In Figure 2, the horizontal axis shows the logarithmic scale of the example size
n, and the vertical axis shows the average accuracy of comparative methods. Similar to
linear regression, the average accuracy of input perturbation is almost the same as that
of objective perturbation with the Gaussian mechanism, when the example size n is large.
Because the average accuracy of input perturbation and objective perturbation approach
the accuracy of non-privacy logistic regression as n increases. However, when n is small,
the accuracy of input perturbation is slightly lower than that of objective perturbation with
the Gaussian mechanism. This behavior can be caused by the approximation error of the
logistic loss function.
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we propose a novel framework for differentially private ERM, input pertur-
bation. In contrast to objective perturbation, input perturbation allows data contributors
to take part in the process of privacy preservation of model learning. From the privacy
analysis of the data releasing of the data contributors, the data collection process in the
input perturbation satisfies (O(
√
n, δ)-differential local privacy. Thus, from the perspective
of data contributors, data collection with input perturbation can be preferable.
Models with randomized examples following the scheme of input perturbation are guaran-
teed to satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy. To achieve this approximation with randomization
by independent data contributors, input perturbation requires that the loss function be
quadratic with respect to the model parameter, w. Applying other loss functions in our
proposed method is remained as an area of our future work.
We compared the utility analysis and the empirical evaluation of input perturbation with
those of output and objective perturbations in terms of the excess empirical risk against the
non-privacy-preserving ERM. We show that the excess empirical risk of the model learned
with input perturbation is O(1/n), which is equivalent to that of objective perturbation in
the optimal setting of σ2u for every data contributors.
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A Notation
Here, we summerize the notations in Table 2.
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Table 2: Table of notations
Notation Description
X ⊆ Rd domain of the d-dimentional feature vector
Y output domain
D ∈ Zn = (X × Z)n database of n examples
zi = (xi, yi) ∈ Z the i-th example of data base D
qi ∈ Rd a vector computed by q(xi, yi)
pi ∈ Rd a vector computed by p(xi, yi)
Q ∈ Rn×d [q1, . . . , qn]T
p ∈ Rd ∑ni=1 pi
W ⊆ Rd domain of the model parameter
w ∈ W the model parameter
η the upper bound of ‖w‖2 for any w ∈ W
` :W × (X × Y)→ R the loss function
ζ the upper bound of ‖∇`‖2
λ the upper bound of ‖∇2`‖2
Jˆ(w;D) the average loss function
wˆ the optimal parameter of the average loss function
J(w;D) the objective function of ERM
w∗ the optimal parameter of ERM
, δ the differential privacy parameters
σ2b the variance of Gaussian distribution
σ2u the variance of Gaussian distribution
q˜i qi is added with noise from N (0, σ
2
u
n )
p˜i pi is added with noise from N (0, σ
2
b
n )
Q˜ [q˜1, . . . , q˜n]
T
p˜
∑n
i=1 p˜i
D˜ D with noise added
Jout(w;D) the objective function of output perturbation
wout the optimal parameter of output perturbation
Jobj(w;D) the objective function of objective perturbation
wobj the optimal parameter of objective perturbation
J in(w; D˜) the objective function of input perturbation
win the optimal parameter of input perturbation
B Proof of Lemma 1
We first introduce known results in order to prove this lemma.
Lemma 3 (Rao (2009)). Let Z be a p× p random matrix drawn from Wishart distribution
Z ∼ Wp(V ,m) with m degrees of freedom and variance matrix V . Let v be a non-zero p×1
constant vector. Then,
vTZv ∼ σ2vχ2m,
where χ2m is the chi-squared distribution with m degrees of freedom and σ
2
v = v
TV v. (Note
that σ2v is a constant; it is positive because V is positive definite).
Lemma 4 (Laurent and Massart (2000)). Let Z ∼ χ2m. Then, for any t > 0,
Pr
(
Z −m ≥ 2√mt+ 2t
)
≤ exp(−t). (6)
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Also, for any t > 0,
Pr
(
m− Z ≥ 2√mt
)
≤ exp(−t). (7)
Lemma 5. Let Z ∼ N (0, 1), then for all t > 1, we have
Pr (|Z| > t) ≤ e−t2/2.
From here, we prove Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 to prove Lemma 1. We first give the tail bound
of wTUTUw.
Lemma 6. Let U = [u1, · · · ,un]T , where ui ∼ N (0, σ
2
u
n Id), and γ > 0. Then, with
probability at least 1− γ/2 we get the following bound:
σ2u
(
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
‖w‖22 ≤ wTUTUw ≤ σ2u
(
1 + 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
+ 2
log(4/γ)
n
)
‖w‖22
Proof. UTU ∼ Wd(σ
2
u
n I, n) holds because ui = (ui1, · · · , uid)T ∼ N (0, σ
2
u
n I). By using
Lemma 3, we thus get wTUTUw ∼ σ2un ‖w‖22χ2n. Noting that wTUTUw ∼ σ
2
u
n ‖w‖22Z, the
upper bound of wTUTUw is derived by applying Eq. (6) of Lemma 4 as follows:
Pr
(
Z − n ≥ 2√nt+ 2t
)
=Pr
(
Z
n
≥ 1 + 2
√
t
n
+ 2
t
n
)
=Pr
(
σ2u
n
‖w‖22Z ≥ σ2u‖w‖22
(
1 + 2
√
t
n
+ 2
t
n
))
=Pr
(
wTUTUw ≥ σ2u‖w‖22
(
1 + 2
√
t
n
+ 2
t
n
))
≤ exp(−t). (8)
In a similar manner, by applying Eq. (7) of Lemma 4, the lower bound of wTUTUw is
given as follows:
Pr
(
n− Z ≥ 2√nt
)
=Pr
(
Z
n
≤ 1− 2
√
t
n
)
=Pr
(
σ2u
n
‖w‖22Z ≤ σ2u‖w‖22
(
1− 2
√
t
n
))
=Pr
(
wTUTUw ≤ σ2u‖w‖22
(
1− 2
√
t
n
))
≤ exp(−t). (9)
By setting γ4 = exp(−t), then we get t = log( 4γ ). Replacing the value of t as t = log( 4γ ) and
combining Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) gives our claim.
Next, we investigate the tail bound of wT (QTU +UTQ)w.
Lemma 7. Let U = [u1, · · · ,un]T , where ui ∼ N (0, σ
2
u
n Id). For γ ∈ (0, 1], with probability
at least 1− γ2 ,
−2
√
2dλσu
√
log(2/γ)
n
‖w‖22 ≤ wT (UTQ+QTU)w ≤ 2
√
2dλσu
√
log(2/γ)
n
‖w‖22.
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Proof. Let v = Qw. Since wTQTUw = wTUTQw, we have wT (QTU + UTQ)w =
2wTQTUw = 2vTUw. From the property of the sum of the normally distributed in-
dependent random variables, we have 2vTUw ∼ N (0, 4σ2un ‖vwT ‖2F ). Since ‖vwT ‖2F =
‖QwwT ‖2F = ‖Q‖2F ‖w‖42 holds, we get wT (QTU + UTQ)w ∼ N (0, 4σ
2
u
n ‖Q‖2F ‖w‖42).
wT (QTU +UTQ)w. Application of Lemma 5 thus yields
Pr
(
|wT (QTU +UTQ)w| > 2 σu√
n
‖Q‖F ‖w‖22t
)
≤ e−t2/2. (10)
By setting γ2 = exp(− t
2
2 ), then we get t =
√
2 log( 2γ ). To make sure t ≥ 1, we need to have
γ ≤ 2√
e
. This is always true for any γ ∈ (0, 1]. Replacing the value of t, with probability at
least 1− γ2 we get the following bound.
|wT (QTU +UTQ)w| ≤ 2
√
2σu‖Q‖F
√
log(2/γ)
n
‖w‖22.
We get the claim since ‖Q‖F ≤
√
dλ.
Proof of Lemma 1. By combining the bounds of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, with probability
at least 1− γ we have the following bound:
σ2u
(
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
‖w‖22 − 2
√
2dλσu
√
log(2/γ)
n
‖w‖22
≤ wT (UTU +QTU +UTQ)w
≤ σ2u
(
1 + 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
+ 2
log(4/γ)
n
)
‖w‖22 + 2
√
2dσuλ
√
log(2/γ)
n
‖w‖22
The lemma holds by letting ∆0w
Tw = wT (UTU +UTQ+QTU)w.
Here is a corollary of Lemma 1
Corollary 2. Let U = [u1, · · · ,un]T , where ui ∼ N (0, σ
2
u
n Id). Let ∆0w
Tw = wT (UTU +
UTQ+QTU)w. Then for any γ > 0, we get the following:
σu ≥
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n +
√
2dλ2 log(2/γ)n +
2λ

(
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
=⇒ 2λ

≤ ∆0 ≤ κ(n, γ) w.p. at least 1− γ
Proof. We solve the following inequation,
κ(n, γ) ≥ 2λ

σ2u
(
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
−2
√
2dλσu
√
log(2/γ)
n
≥ 2λ

Then, one of results of the above inequation is σu as the left side of Corollary 2. Hence,
with σu as the left side of Corollary 2 we have
κ(n, γ) ≥ 2λ

w.p. at least 1 (11)
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From Lemma 1, we have
κ(n, γ) ≤ ∆0 ≤ κ(n, γ) w.p at least 1− γ (12)
Therefore from Eq. 11 and Eq. 12 with σu as the left side of Corollary 2 we have
2λ

≤ ∆0 ≤ κ(n, γ) w.p. at least 1− γ
Corollary 3. When σu =
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n +
√
2dλ2
log(2/γ)
n +
2λ

(
1−2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
1−2
√
log(4/γ)
n
, we have
• the upper bound of σu is σu ≤
(
4
√
2dλ+ 4
√
2λ

)√
log 4γ
n +
√
2λ
 with n ≥ 16 log 4γ
• the lower bound of σu is σu ≥
√
2dλ
√
log 2γ
n +
√
2λ
 .
Proof. We derive the lower bound of σu as
σu ≥
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n +
√
2λ

(
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
)
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
≥
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
+
√
2λ
√
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
≥
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n
+
√
2λ

We derive the upper bound of σu as
σu ≤
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n +
√
2dλ2 log(2/γ)n +
2λ

1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
≤
√
2dλ
√
log(2/γ)
n +
√
2dλ2 log(2/γ)n +
√
2λ

1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
−
√
2λ

+
√
2λ

≤
2
√
2dλ
√
log(4/γ)
n + 2
√
2λ

√
log(4/γ)
n
1− 2
√
log(4/γ)
n
+
√
2λ

≤
2
√
2dλ+ 2
√
2λ
√
n
log(4/γ) − 2
+
√
2λ

Letting n ≥ 16 log 4γ , we have
√
n
log(4/γ) − 2 > 12
√
n
log(4/γ) . Hence,
σu ≤
2
√
2dλ+ 2
√
2λ

1
2
√
n
log(4/γ)
+
√
2λ

≤
(
4
√
2dλ+ 4
√
2λ

)√
log(4/γ)
n
+
√
2λ

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C Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. The objective function of input perturbation method is rearranged as
follows:
J in(w; D˜) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
wT q˜iq˜
T
i w − p˜Ti w + si
)
+
∆in
2n
‖w‖22
=
1
n
(
1
2
wQ˜
T
Q˜w − p˜Tw + s
)
+
∆− 2λ
2n
‖w‖22
=
1
n
(
1
2
w(Q+U)T (Q+U)w − (p− b)Tw + s
)
+
∆− 2λ
2n
‖w‖22
=
1
n
(
1
2
wQTQw − pTw + s
)
+
bTw
n
+
1
2n
wT (UTU +UTQ+QTU)w +
∆− 2λ
2n
‖w‖22
=
1
2n
∑
i
`(f(w,xi), yi) +
bTw
n
+
1
2n
wT (UTU +UTQ+QTU)w +
∆− 2λ
2n
‖w‖22
=
1
2n
∑
i
`(f(w,xi), yi) +
bTw
n
+
1
2n
(∆0 + ∆− 2λ

)‖w‖22 (13)
where ∆0w
Tw = wT (UTU + UTQ + QTU)w. Noting that b follows Gaussian distri-
bution N (0, σ2b Id×d), Eq. 13 is equivalent to the objective function of the objective per-
turbation method with the Gaussian mechanism except the regularization parameter. Let
α = arg minw∈W J
in. Then, from Theorem 2 in (Kifer et al., 2012), α is (, δ′)-differentially
private if the following conditions are true:
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ

≥ 2λ

and σ2b =
ζ2(8 log(2/δ′) + 4)
2
The second condition on σ2b is always satisfied by the parameter setting in Algorithm 1 of
input perturbation. The first condition is equivalent to ∆0 ≥ 2λ because ∆ > 2λ holds by
assumption. From Lemma 2, ∆0 ≥ 2λ holds w.p. at least 1−γ if σ2u is set as in Algorithm 1.
Thus, the output of Algorithm 2 satisfies (, δ′)-differential privacy w.p. at least 1−γ. This
can be transformed into a deterministic statement by using a proof technique of Theorem
2 in (Kifer et al., 2012). Let goodu be the set {U ∈ Rn×d|∆0 ≥ 2λ }. Then, from the
definition of differential privacy, we have
e−(Pr
(
win = α|U ∈ goodu;D′
)− δ′) ≤
Pr
(
win = α|U ∈ goodu;D
) ≤ ePr (win = α|U ∈ goodu;D′)+ δ′
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where Pr (U ∈ goodu) = 1− γ. With this, we get the following.
Pr
(
win = α;D
)
= Pr
(
win = α|U ∈ goodu;D
)
Pr (U ∈ goodu)
+ Pr
(
win = α|U ∈ goodu;D
)
Pr
(
U ∈ goodu
)
≤ (ePr (win = α|U ∈ goodu;D′)+ δ′)Pr (U ∈ goodu) + γ
≤ ePr (win = α|U ∈ goodu;D′)Pr (U ∈ goodu) + δ′Pr (U ∈ goodu) + γ
≤ ePr (win = α;D′)+ δ′(1− γ) + γ
≤ ePr (win = α;D′)+ δ′ + γ − δ′γ
≤ ePr (win = α;D′)+ δ′ + γ
Letting γ = δ2 and δ
′ = δ2 we have
Pr
(
win = α;D
) ≤ ePr (win = α;D′)+ δ,
which concludes the proof.
D Proof of Theorem 2
We first show some lemmas for Theorem 2.
Lemma 8. Suppose ∆0 ≥ 0. Let J#(w;D) =
∑
i `(f(w,xi), yi) +
∆+∆0− 2λ
2n and the
minimizer be w# = arg minw∈`W J#(w;D). Let win be the output of Algorithm 2. Then,
‖w# −win‖2 ≤ 2‖b‖
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
Proof. From Eq. 13, J in is
∆+∆0− 2λ
2n -strong convex. Thus, we have
J in(w#; D˜) ≥J in(win; D˜) + ∆ + ∆0 −
2λ

2n
‖w# −win‖22
J#(w#;D) +
bTw#
n
≥J#(win;D) + b
Twin
n
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖w# −win‖22 (14)
≥J#(w#;D) + b
Twin
n
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖w# −win‖22
bT (w# −win) ≥∆ + ∆0 −
2λ

2
‖w# −win‖22
‖b‖2‖w# −win‖2 ≥
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2
‖w# −win‖22
‖w# −win‖2 ≤ 2‖b‖
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
To have Eq. 14, we used that fact that w# is the minimizer of J#.
Lemma 9. Suppose ∆0 ≥ 0. Let J#(w;D) =
∑
i `(f(w,xi), yi) +
∆+∆0− 2λ
2n and the
minimizer be w# = arg minw∈`W J#(w;D). Let win be the output of Algorithm 2. Then,
J#(win;D)− J#(w#;D) ≤ 2‖b‖
2
2
n(∆ + ∆0 − 2λ )
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Proof. From Eq. 14 in Lemma 8,
J#(w#;D) +
bTw#
n
≥ J#(win;D) + b
Twin
n
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖w# −win‖22
J#(win;D)− J#(w#;D) ≤ b
T (w# −win)
n
− ∆ + ∆0 −
2λ

2n
‖w# −win‖22
≤ ‖b‖2‖w
# −win‖2
n
≤ 2‖b‖
2
2
n(∆ + ∆0 − 2λ )
(15)
To have Eq. 15, we used the result of Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. Suppose ∆0 ≥ 0. Let wˆ be the minimizer of Jˆ(w;D) and let win be the output
of Algorithm 2. Then,
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D) ≤ 2‖b‖
2
2
n(∆ + ∆0 − 2λ )
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 (16)
Proof.
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D)
≤(J#(win;D)− J#(w#;D)) + (J#(w#;D)− J#(wˆ;D))
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 −
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
n
‖win‖22
≤(J#(win;D)− J#(w#;D)) + ∆ + ∆0 −
2λ

2n
‖wˆ‖22 −
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
n
‖win‖22 (17)
≤ 2‖b‖
2
2
n(∆ + ∆0 − 2λ )
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 −
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
n
‖win‖22 (18)
≤ 2‖b‖
2
2
n(∆ + ∆0 − 2λ )
+
∆ + ∆0 − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22
To have Eq. 17, we used the fact that J#(w#;D)− J#(wˆ;D) ≤ 0. Eq. 18 is obtained by
applying the result of Lemma 9.
Proof of Lemma 2. We start from the upper bound Eq. 16 in Lemma 10. From Lemma 28
in (Kifer et al., 2012) (and Lemma 2 in (Dasgupta and Schulman, 2007)), we have w.p. at
least 1− β
‖b‖2 ≤
√
2dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4) log
1
β
2
. (19)
From Corollary 2 with σ2u in Algorithm 1, we have w.p. at least 1− γ
2λ

≤ ∆0 ≤ κ(n, γ). (20)
Substituting Eq. 19 and Eq. 20 into Eq. 16, we have w.p. at least 1− β − γ
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D) ≤
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4) log
1
β
n2∆
+
∆ + κ(n, γ)− 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 (21)
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Substituting value of κ(n, γ) in Lemma 2 into Eq. 16 we have, w.p. at least 1− β − γ.
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D) ≤
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4) log
1
β
n2∆
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22
+
σ2u + 2σ
2
u
√
log(4/γ)
n + 2σ
2
u
log(4/γ)
n + 2
√
2dλσu
√
log(2/γ)
n
2n
‖wˆ‖22 −
2λ

2n
‖wˆ‖22
≤
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4) log
1
β
n2∆
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22
+
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u
√
log 4γ + σ
2
u
log 4γ√
n
+ σuλ
√
2d log 2γ
n
√
n
‖wˆ‖22 (22)
Proof of Theorem 2. We have
2
√
log
4
γ
≤ log 4
γ
+ 1 = log 4 + log
1
γ
+ 1
log
4
γ
= log 4 + log
1
γ
2
√
log
2
γ
≤ log 2
γ
+ 1 = log 2 + log
1
γ
+ 1
By substituting above results into Eq. 22, then w.p. at least 1− β − γ we have
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D)
≤
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4) log
1
β
n2∆
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
(
σ2u +
2σ2u√
n
+
√
2dλσu
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
log
1
γ
+
(
σ2u(log 4 + 1) +
2σ2u√
n
log 4 +
√
2dλσu(log 2 + 1)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
≤ 4dζ
2(8 log 4δ + 4)
n2∆
log
1
β
+
(
σ2u +
2σ2u√
n
+
√
2dλσu
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
log
1
γ
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
(
σ2u(log 4 + 1) +
2σ2u√
n
log 4 +
√
2dλσu(log 2 + 1)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
Letting β = γ = ν, w.p. at least 1− 2ν
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D) ≤
(
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4)
n2∆
+
(
σ2u +
2σ2u√
n
+
√
2dλσu
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
)
log
1
ν
+
(
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
(
σ2u(log 4 + 1) +
2σ2u√
n
log 4 +
√
2dλσu(log 2 + 1)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
)
≤ a log 1
ν
+ b
where
a =
(
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4)
n2∆
+
(
σ2u +
2σ2u√
n
+
√
2dλσu
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
)
b =
(
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
(
σ2u(log 4 + 1) +
2σ2u√
n
log 4 +
√
2dλσu(log 2 + 1)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
)
(23)
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By setting s = a log(1/ν) + b, we get ν = eb/ae−s/a. Substitution this into Eq. 23 gives
Pr
(
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D) ≥ s
)
≤ 2eb/ae−s/a. (24)
From here, we compute the expectation of excess empirical risk by removing ν in the above
equation.
E
[
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D)
]
≤ ξ +
∫ ∞
ξ
Pr
(
Jˆ(win)− Jˆ(wˆ) ≥ s
)
ds
≤ ξ +
∫ ∞
ξ
2eb/ae−s/ads
≤ ξ + 2aeb/ae−ξ/a
Using ξ = b, we have
E
[
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D)
]
≤ 2a+ b
≤ 2
(
4dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4)
n2∆
+
(
σ2u +
2σ2u√
n
+
√
2dλσu
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
)
+
(
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
(
σ2u(log 4 + 1) +
2σ2u√
n
log 4 +
√
2dλσu(log 2 + 1)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
)
≤
(
8dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4)
n2∆
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22
)
+
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 +
(
σ2u log(4e
3) +
2σ2u log(4e
2)√
n
+
√
2dλσu log(2e
3)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
(25)
To get a tight bound of E
[
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D)
]
, we set ∆ = Θ
(√
ζ2d log 1δ
‖wˆ‖2
)
. σu is set as
the lowest value specified in Algorithm 2. Noting that σu ≤
(
4
√
2dλ+ 2
√
2λ

)√
log(8/δ)
n +√
2λ
 with n ≥ 16 log 8δ from Corollary 3, we have σu = O(1). Hence, using these settings
with Eq. 25, we have the following:
8dζ2(8 log 4δ + 4)
n2∆
+
∆
2n
‖wˆ‖22 =O
(
ζ‖wˆ‖2
√
d log(1/δ)
n
)
σ2u − 2λ
2n
‖wˆ‖22 ≤O
(
1
n
√
n
)
(
σ2u log(4e
3) +
2σ2u log(4e
2)√
n
+
√
2dλσu log(2e
3)
) ‖wˆ‖22
2n
√
n
=O
(
1
n
√
n
)
From these, we thus have
E
[
Jˆ(win;D)− Jˆ(wˆ;D)
]
= O
(
ζ‖wˆ‖2
√
d log(1/δ)
n
)
by setting ∆ = Θ
(√
ζ2d log 1δ
‖wˆ‖2
)
and σu as the lowest value specified in Algorithm 1 and
n ≥ 16 log 8δ .
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E Proof of Corollary 1
Adding a Gaussian noise into the released data satisfies (, δ)-differential local privacy as
well as the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork et al., 2014). We derive a differential local privacy
version of the Gaussian mechanism as follows.
Theorem 3. Let X ⊆ Rd is a bounded domain of input such that ‖x − x′‖2 ≤ B for any
x,x′ ∈ X . Given  ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0, a mechanism M outputs M(x) = x + Z where
Z ∼ N (0, σ2I). If σ ≥ cB/ where c > √2 ln(1.25/δ), M is (, δ)-differentially locally
private.
Proof. From the definition of the mechanism, we have for any r ∈ Rd, x,x′ ∈ X
Pr (M(x) = r) =Pr (x+ Z = r)
=
1√
(2piσ2)d
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖r − x‖22
)
=
1√
(2piσ2)d
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖r − x′ + x′ − x‖22
)
=
1√
(2piσ2)d
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(
‖r − x′‖22 + ‖x′ − x‖22 + 2(r − x′)T (x′ − x)
))
= exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(‖x′ − x‖22 + 2(r − x′)T (x′ − x)))Pr (x′ + Z = r)
= exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(
2(r − x)T (x′ − x)− ‖x′ − x‖22
))
Pr (x′ + Z = r)
= exp
(
1
σ2
(x− r)T (x′ − x) + ‖x
′ − x‖22
2σ2
)
Pr (x′ + Z = r) .
M is -local differentially private as long as 1σ2 (x − r)T (x′ − x) +
‖x′−x‖22
2σ2 ≤ . However,
the condition does not always hold since r is any element in Rd. Therefore, we introduce δ
such that
Pr
(
x+ Z = r : r ∈ Rd, 1
σ2
(x− r)T (x′ − x) + ‖x
′ − x‖22
2σ2
> 
)
≤ δ.
Let E = {r ∈ Rd : 1σ2 (x− r)T (x′ − x) + ‖x
′−x‖22
2σ2 ≤ }. Then, we have
Pr (M(x) = r) =Pr (x+ Z = r)
=Pr (x+ Z = r, r ∈ E) + Pr (x+ Z = r, r /∈ E)
≤ePr (x′ + Z = r) + δ.
Since Z is a Gaussian with variance σ2I, −QZ ∼ N (0, σ2I) for arbitrary orthogonal matrix
Q. Thus, for arbitrary orthogonal matrix Q we have
Pr
(
x+ Z = r : r ∈ Rd, 1
σ2
(x− r)T (x′ − x) + ‖x
′ − x‖22
2σ2
> 
)
=Pr
(
Z = r − x : r ∈ Rd, (x− r)T (x′ − x) > σ2− ‖x
′ − x‖22
2
)
=Pr
(
Z = QT (x− r) : r ∈ Rd, (x− r)T (x′ − x) > σ2− ‖x
′ − x‖22
2
)
=Pr
(
ZTQT (x′ − x) > σ2− ‖x
′ − x‖22
2
)
.
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Choosing Q such that its first row vector is along with x′ − x and the others are linearly
independent on x′ − x yields
Pr
(
ZTQT (x′ − x) > σ2− ‖x
′ − x‖22
2
)
=Pr
(
Z1‖x′ − x‖2 > σ2−
‖x′ − x‖22
2
)
=Pr
(
Z1
σ
>
σ
‖x′ − x‖2 −
‖x′ − x‖2
2σ
)
,
where Z1 ∼ N (0, σ2). From the proof of the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork et al., 2014), for
 ∈ (0, 1), if σ ≥√2 ln(1.25/δ)B/, we have
Pr
(
Z1
σ
>
σ
‖x′ − x‖2 −
‖x′ − x‖2
2σ
)
≤ δ.
The proof of Corollary 1 is direct application of Theorem 3.
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